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Abstract
Real networks are not onlymulti-layered yet also dynamic. The role of coordinated network evolution
regarding dynamicmulti-layer networkswhere both network and strategy evolution simultaneously
showdiverse interdependence by layers remains poorly addressed.Here, we propose a general and
simple coevolution framework to analyze how coordination of different dynamical processes affects
strategy propagation in synergistically evolving interdependent networks. The strategic feedback
constitutes themain driving force of network evolution yet the inherent cross-layer self-optimization
functions as its compensation.We show that these two ingredients often catalyze a better performance
of network evolution in propagating cooperation. Coordinated network evolutionmay be a double-
edged sword to cooperation and the network-adapting rate plays a crucial role inflipping its double-
sided effect. It often economizes the cost and time consumption for driving the system to the full
cooperation phase. Importantly, strongly coupled slow-tuned networks can outperformweakly
coupled fast-regulated networks in solving social dilemmas, highlighting the fundamental advantages
of coordinated network evolution and the importance of synergistic effect of dynamical processes in
upholding human cooperation inmultiplex networks.
1. Introduction
Decoding the origin of cooperation aswell as its persistence in humans and other species is the coremission of
evolutionary game theory [1]. The heart of this enduring puzzle lies in two aspects. First, altruistic cooperation
often benefits others yet incurs a cost to its carriers. In sharp contrast, however, selfish defectionmost of the time
free rides on others’ contributions at almost no cost to its carriers. From an evolutionary point of view, as a
consequence, cooperation becomes the one that should have beenwiped out [2, 3]. This theoretical prediction
gives prominence to an increasing inconsistencywith ubiquitous cooperation that has laid a solid foundation for
the success of human societies. Aside from this point, if both cooperate it commonlymaximizes the collective
good in this context, thus also establishing a dilemma regardingwhat is best for an individual andwhat is best for
the group [4].Myriadmechanisms such as kin selection [5, 6], punishment [7–10] and voluntary participation
[11] are proposed to rescue such cooperation tragedy in this spectrum (see review [12, 13]). In particular, by
taking into account the following aspects, the recent shift from evolutionary games inwell-mixed populations
[14–16] and static networks [17–23] to evolutionary games inmultiplex networks [24–27] and dynamic
networks [28–34] has stimulatedmounting efforts in exploring cooperation dynamics inmore realistic
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First, the vastmajority of literatures to date have suggested that inmany circumstances single-layer networks
are no longer suitable for capturing the nature of backbones of physical, biological, and social systems due to
their inability to encode the universalmultiplexity of real systems [39, 40].More importantly, systemdynamics
inmultiplexes in general differs dramatically from that in simplexes by virtue of diverse problem-oriented
multi-domain interdependence. For instance, in the study of interdependent networks, Buldyrev et al [41]
reported that failure of nodes in one layer is likely to beget failure of dependent nodes in other layers, thus
causing a cascade of failure. The analysis around topology interdependence has become a primarymeans of
mitigating cascading failures. In [42], Parshani et al also showed analytically that two different types of links are
needed for proper characterization of real networks. For a detailed review, refer to [43–46]. In particular,
regarding cooperation dynamics, Gómez-Gardeñes et al [47] established a prisoner’s dilemma game in
multiplex networks and evidenced that the increasedmultiplexity favors cooperation bymeans of enhancing the
so-called cooperation resilience, whereby evolutionary dynamics strikingly profits the survival of cooperation
even in an environment overwhelmingly unfavorable to altruistic behaviour. Likewise, Battiston et al [48]
further investigated key determinants of public cooperation by focusing on the interplay between the structure
overlap and inherent game parameters in such networks. In addition, a series of reports on directed and
undirected interdependence between two populations byWang et al [37, 49, 50] also revealed that the state-
feedback based interdependence as well as its optimal organization can dramatically uphold cooperation in the
formof a variety of biased utility functions. To sumup, these efforts not only injected new impetus into the
activity of exploring cooperation dynamics yet also broke through the limitation of the traditionally and
frequently used single-layer network and therefore broadened the theoretical framework for addressing the
cooperation puzzle.
Second, real networks are not static yet continuously evolving dynamic entities. Comparedwith static
networks, dynamic networks have inherent advantages owing to their ability to adapt the structure flexibly and
properly in response to the rich variety of real-time feedback.More importantly, there has been an increasing
urgency to consider network dynamics and dynamics in networks as awhole rather than separately. Adhering to
this thought, by synthesizing strategy dynamics and network dynamics, Pacheco et al [51, 52]designed several
delicate coevolutionarymodels. Their novel insights verified analytically an equivalent transformation between
different social dilemmas provided that network dynamics proceedsmuch faster than strategy dynamics,
whereby cooperation can be greatly boosted. In particular, they also tested and extended their conclusion to a
broader scope using extensive numerical simulations. Yet, the study of dynamic networks has never been
confined to the theoretical level. As an excellent experiment work, [53] byRand et al explained clearly with real
human interactions that the fast network-regulation is a necessary requirement for cooperation to evolve in a
dynamically organized game.Quite recently, Akcay [54] also reported how cooperation collapses and is rescued
in evolving dynamic networks that are synergistically driven by social inheritance and randomconnections. He
introduced interaction based selection into their previous novel dynamical processmodel [55], focused on the
coevolution of social network and social traits, and conducted comprehensive analysis on the conditions
favorable and unfavorable to cooperation. For the detailed literature review on coevolutionary dynamics, refer
to the systematic review by Perc et al [35]. In fact, in addition to underpinning cooperation, dynamic networks
also retainmerits inmany other areas such as optimizing disease control [56, 57] and economizing control
energy [58].
Yet, despite the abundance of studies regarding above two eye-catching properties of real networks,much
less is known about the issue of coordinated network evolution that should be a fundamental problem in the
analysis of evolving dynamic interdependent networkswhere both strategy dynamics and network dynamics
exhibit significant interdependence at the layer level. In addition, the universalmulti-domain nature of complex
networks generally endues agents an inherent compensation channel to self-assess behaviour in pursuit of
personal evolutionary success. Taking these regards into consideration, herewe design aminimal
coevolutionarymodel, inwhich network dynamics of two sub-layers coordinates with each other based on an
inherent cross-layer self-assessment compensation rule, to focus on how the coordination of different network
dynamics transforms the propagation of altruistic behaviour in this context. Unlike previous studies, the fate of
each link is determined not only by evaluations from two terminal nodes in the current habitat layer yet also
directly or indirectly by feedback from the other interdependent layer. The duration of each link evolves in a
moremoderate and rational way, then the update and remove of links distinguish apparently from the previous
‘either-keep-or-delete’mode that is in general deterministic in the link updating stage. In subsequent sections,
we show that the cross-layer self-optimization compensationmethod, proposed on the basis ofmulti-domain
nature ofmultiplex networks,most of the time enables dynamical processes of different layers to serve as a
mirror to each other, which to some extent allows the possibility of inherent self-correction inmultiplex
networks and upgrades in some aspects the functionality of dynamic networks.
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2. Evolution of cooperation in synergistically evolving dynamicmultiplex networks
2.1. Population structure
In this study, we employ two ER-like randomgraphs, namelyA andB, to characterize the initial interdependent
contact networks. Nodes that compose two networks are the same, while links between them are different. One
possible exemplification to such scenario is the interdependentmulti-domain social network inwhich identical
agents engage in nonidentical social relationships with generally different strategies.
i.M links are utilized to randomly pairN nodes to generate each of two aforementioned nonidentical ER-like
networks. Therefore, such an interdependent network totally includes 2M links andNnodes.
ii. Once a link in layerA (B) is created between two agents, termed iA and j1A (iB and j2B), by initializations or by
linking dynamics, iA and j1A (iB and j2B) are assignedwith an expected duration i jA A1t and j iA A1t ( i jB B2t and
j iB B2
t ) towards this link, respectively.
iii. In general, i j j iA A A A1 1t t¹ and i j j iB B B B2 2t t¹ , also i jA A1t , j iA A1t , i jB B2t , j iB B2t ä[0, τmax], and τmax<1. The
rationale behind these assumptions lies in the following aspects. On the one hand, there are no permanent
relationships in reality, thus τmax<1.On the other hand, consider that different agents often have different
perceptions towards the importance of a given partnership, so inmost cases i j j iA A A A1 1t t¹ and also
i j j iB B B B2 2
t t¹ .Without loss of generality, we use τmax=0.95 throughout this research.
In the initialization stage, each agent in each network is designed either as a cooperator (C) or as a defector
(D)with equal probability.
2.2. Two-player prisoner’s dilemma game
In the prisoner’s dilemma game [17], there exist three possible strategy pairs amongwhichmutual cooperation
produces the rewardR, mutual defection leads to the punishmentP, and themixed offers the cooperator the
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whereR=1,T=1+u, S=0,P=u andu is a rescaled parameter quantifying dilemma strength.
In each time step, an agent, namely i, is chosen randomly from the population as the game organizer. Then
another two agents, namely j1A and j2B, are randomly drawn from iʼs neighborhood as iʼs co-players in layerA
and layerB, respectively. i plays the prisoner’s dilemma gamewith j1A and j2B simultaneously and all these three
agents collect their payoff in accordance with thematrix (1). If i has no neighbors in both layers, another agent
will be randomly chosen as the game organizer.
2.3.Multi-player public goods game
In the public goods game [59], an agent, namely i, plays the gamewith all adjacent neighbors in layerX (X=A or
B) by simultaneously decidingwhether or not to contribute to the commonpool according to their strategies.
Specifically, the cooperator contributes afixed amount c= 1, however, the defector contributes nothing.
Finally, the total contributions aremultiplied by a synergy factor g and shared by each player of the focal group in
this layer regardless of their contributions. Then each groupmember collects the payoff in linewith equation (2):
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whereX is one ofA orB. xXp and sxX are the payoff and strategy of x inX, respectively.We assume that s 1jX =
means j carries aC strategy inX and s 0jX = indicates j adopts aD strategy inX. iXW is the neighborhood of i in
layerX and kiX is its size.
2.4. Self-reliant and coordinated network evolution
After game interaction, i, together with other randomly chosen co-players, namely j1A and j2B, simultaneously
adjusts their own expected duration towards corresponding links in two layers.Without loss of generality, as for
themulti-player public goods game, we let i randomly select one linkwith her co-players in each layer to update.
Herewe introduce two classes of network evolution according to the information applied in linking dynamics.
One is the self-reliant network evolution based solely on strategic feedback from the current habitat layer. The
other is the coordinated network evolution that considers alsomutual affections of different network-adapting
processes. For comparison, we classify the population into two categories. One type are common agents who
3
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adopt the self-reliant dynamical linking. The others are smart agents who employ the coordinated dynamical
linking. Andwe denote ρ the fraction of smart agents in the population.More details about the evolution of link














































































































































































































where i jA A1
*t is the updated i jA A1t for the next generation.ΔA (ΔB) characterizesAʼs (Bʼs)network-adapting speed.
i iA B encodes the inter-layer coordinationwhen agents reshape local contact networks and highlights the
significance of self-assessment. In this way, unlike previous ‘either-keep-or-remove’model, a certain amount of
stochasticity is introduced into linking dynamics and accounts for thewidespread impermanency of partnership
in real-world. Concretely, if iAʼs co-player j1A is carrying aC (D) strategy, then nomatter what strategy iA adopts
shewill be satisfied (dissatisfied)with this partnership. In this regard, i jA A1t will increase (decrease) byΔA, as
illustrated by figure 1(a). If i jA A1t reaches its limits, i.e. zero as theminimumor τmax as themaximum, in the
evolution, then it only shifts in the other direction. Comparedwith equation (3), the rationale lies behind
equation (4) is aside from strategic feedback that comes from current habitat layer, itmost of the time
incorporates themessage captured in the other layer. Such supplementarymessage often offers an agent a state-
dependent compensation choice.
In each time step, without loss of generality, we let the game organizer, i.e. iA and iB, to determine either to
keep, with the probability i jA A1t and i jB B2t , or to remove, with the likelihood 1 i jA A1t- and 1 i jB B2t- ,
corresponding links (i.e. li jA A1 and li jB B2 ) in both layers. In order to highlight the interdependence between
different social or nonsocial domains, wemake the following assumptions: In the case that li jA A1 and li jB B2 are a
Figure 1. Schematic diagram for link duration adjustment. For simplicity, it only illustrates how the focal agent iAupdates her expected
duration i jA A1t regarding the link li jA A1 in networkA. In the present study, the driving force responsible for network evolution generally
includes two parts. One is the strategic feedback from the current habitat layer (a) and the other is the cross-layer self-assessment (b). If
iA is a smart agent, she updates her local contact network by integrating feedbacks transferred by both channels in (a) and (b). If iA is a
common agent, she only considers the strategic feedback as shown in (a). Regardless of the specific channel, the driving force tends to
push iA to lengthen (shorten) her expected duration regarding the concerned linkwhen she is satisfied (dissatisfied)with the
corresponding feedback. The arrow indicates the source of the feedback. The typical structure slice in a two-layer interdependent
network is plotted in (c).
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pair of overlapping links in two layers, each of them is retainedwith the probability
2
iA j A iB j B1 2
t t+
and cut off with
the probability 1
2
iA j A iB j B1 2-
t t+
. If any one of them, e.g. li jA A1 (li jB B2 ), is removed, then the other li jB B2 (li jA A1 ) is
simultaneously rewired. In the case that i breaks a link, i establishes a new connection to another randomly
drawn agent in the same layer excluding iʼs existing neighbors, keeping the population size constant. Self and
cross-layer connections are forbidden in this study. Because each agentwill be selected once on average to be as
the game organizer in a complete round, there are no bias or preferences towards any agents. In addition, if
agents are isolated nodes in one layer, we assume that they only adopt the self-reliant dynamical linking because
of invalid inter-layer feedback in this case, regardless of their types (i.e. the common or the smart).
Comparedwith single-layer networks, themulti-domain nature ofmultiplex networks can inherently offer
agents a natural compensation channel to self-correct behaviour bymeans of allowing them the possibility of
self-assessment of evolutionary success between different layers. And a very important point lies in that such
convenient and inherent compensation choices incur almost no cost to agents.With this regard, we propose an
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According to equation (5), agents autonomously choose appropriate compensation including positive and
negative in exact accordancewith the inherent self-assessment of evolutionary outcome in two layers. For
instance, regardingα>0, if the income in the other layer surpasses that in the current layer, by a large
probability negative compensation is applied and the feedback from the other layer prefers to revise the
concerned link, and vice versa, as shown infigure 1(b). The greater the income gap, the stronger the
compensation effect. Naturally, themulti-domain nature ofmultiplex networks allows a convenient realization
of inherent self-optimization compensationmethod. This is very important and cautious in terms of grabbing
andmaking use of information from the perspective of game theory, and is also a point frequently overlooked by
previous literatures. In this regard, we claim that such an inherent self-optimization compensation scheme is in
large part able to avoid far-fetched spies on evolution information of others andmeanwhile advises agents to
shift their focus to themselves. By this approach, the input to power the evolution of network is definitely
enriched to comprise two elements. One part comes from the outside, i.e. rival’s strategy, and one part comes
from the inside, i.e. self-assessment.We show that such a simple yet reliable compensation approach yields an
optimization of short-term strategy feedback. Importantly, thewell-reported optimal partner choice that used
to be seen as the best response to the rival’s behaviour seems to be not necessarily optimal, from a long-term
perspective, for structure adapting in evolving dynamic interdependent networks.
2.5. Strategy evolution
In this section, an agent, namely iX, updates her strategy by imitating the strategy of another randomly chosen












In linewith the previous study [26], we use themean payoff that i collects in all layers to quantify iʼs effective
payoffΠi that ultimatelymaps into strategy dynamics, i.e. i 2
iX iYP = p p+ .β is the selection intensity and
introduces a noise into strategy-learning [34]. Cross-layer strategy-learning is forbidden in this work.We
calculate the final cooperation level in the equilibrium state by averaging over 100–1000 independent runs after a
sufficiently long transient time.
3. Results
It is a primary feature that each sub-system (i.e. each sub-layer) always equilibrates either in the full cooperation
state or in the full defection state,making coexistence of different strategies impossible. As a consequence, from
the perspective of the entire population there are three equilibrium combinations amongwhich full-Cmeans
two layers converge to all cooperation equilibrium, full-D indicates they evolve to all defection equilibrium, and
mixture implies one converges to all cooperationwhile the other to all defection. Infigure 2, we show in detail
three representative time evolution converging to different equilibrium states in one complete run. In evolving
5
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dynamic interdependent networks, coordinated network-adapting is able tomake cooperative strategymore
competitive even in the parameter region overwhelmingly unfavorable to cooperation provided that agents can
adaptively adjust their social ties in accordance with the integrated feedback from sub-layers. Remarkably, it is
often the case that the intertwined coevolutionary dynamics reinforces social ties between cooperators even if
the abundance of cooperation in the population declines. Inmost cases, Lcc climbs or holds steady infigure 2
when Fc declines in the early stage of evolution, independent of the ultimate evolutionary outcome. It implies
that coordinated linking dynamics is likely to increase the probability bywhich cooperationmutually feeds each
other. In other words, itmay help enhance thewell-reported direct reciprocity [12] that remarkably contributes
to the diffusion of cooperation in structured populations.
How the cooperation level varies in dependence onΔA,ΔB and u in the two-player prisoner’s dilemma game
(onΔA,ΔB and g in themulti-player public goods game) infigure 3 stresses the familiar dominating effect of
network-adapting speed on the evolution of cooperation in evolving dynamic networks [28, 29, 34, 52, 53].
Consider that there are usually critical parameter thresholdsmarking the emergence, extinction of cooperation
and full-C phase in the aforementioned social dilemmas.Hence, the evolutionary performance of concerned
mechanisms can be examined by analyzing specific shifts of these critical points. Infigure 3, a higherΔA (ΔB)
always results in a larger threshold value of u beyondwhich cooperation vanishes in the prisoner’s dilemma
game andmeanwhile a smaller threshold value of g aroundwhich cooperation emerges in the public goods
game. Simultaneously, a higherΔA (ΔB) usually corresponds to a larger value of u beyondwhich full-C phase
fades away in the prisoner’s dilemma game and also a smaller value of g aroundwhich full-C phase emerges in
the public goods game. It thus demonstrates, nomatter in which game, coevolution dynamics commonly seats
cooperation at amore competitive position provided that the rapid adjustment to network structure in response
to immediate game feedback is possible. In general, themore agile the network adapting, themore competitive
the cooperation.
To demonstrate the role of coordinated network-adapting in the evolution of cooperation in dynamic
interdependent networks, we show infigure 4 theΔ−u phase diagram for the prisoner’s dilemma game, as
obtained for ρ=0 (figures 4(a) and (d)), ρ=0.5 (figures 4(b) and (e)), ρ=1 (figures 4(c) and (f)), for
Figure 2.Representative time evolution residing in three different equilibrium states including full-C (first row),mixture (second row)
and fullD (third row), with the same system configuration in the prisoner’s dilemma game. For each row, thefirst columndepicts the
statistical quantities of the entire population and the rest for other two sub-populations (sub-layers). FC is the cooperation level. LCC,
LCD, and LDD denote the abundance of links paring twoC strategies, oneC and oneD, and twoD strategies, respectively.M=2000,
N=1000,α=10,β=10, ρ=1,ΔA=ΔB=0.1, u=0.23.
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ΔA=ΔB (figures 4(a)–(c)), and for A BD ¹ D (figures 4(d)–(f)), respectively. Thefiguremanifests a strong and
uncommon impact of coordinated network evolution on cooperation. First, the growth of u and network-
adapting rate forΔA=ΔB ( A BD ¹ D ) leads to the slight (remarkable) territory expansion ofmixture phase
(areas enclosed by dashed separating lines infigure 4). This difference can be explained as follows. On the one
hand, the collaborative network evolution has the homogenization effect for apparently unequal sub-layer
adapting rates as a result of self-optimization compensation as implied in equation (5). On the other hand, phase
separating lines for A BD ¹ D are expected to be non-coincident considering the dominating role of network-
adapting rate in this study. Accordingly, the homogenization of non-coincident coexistence areas in two sub-
layers leads to the notable territorial extension ofmixture phase. Second, regarding relatively lownetwork-
regulation rates, cooperationmost of the time thrives as ρ gradually intensifies.On the contrary, for relatively
high network-regulation rates, decreasing ρ fertilizes theflourish of cooperation. In this regard, consider ρ
encodes the timescale between the self-reliant and coordinated network evolution.Hence, the change in
curvature of dashed phase separating lines infigure 4 (follow the order from figures 4(a) to 4(c) aswell as from
figures 4(d) to 4(f)) probably suggests a double-edged sword effect of coordinated network evolution on
cooperation and also its intimate associationwith the network-adapting rate. In order to verify andmake it easy
to comprehend this point, we clarify infigure 5 a sharp contrast between the positive effect of collaborative
network evolution on cooperation in the slow-regulated network and its negative effect on cooperation in the
fast-regulated network and this further validates the above analysis.
Figure 3.The dominating role of network-adapting rate in promotion of cooperation, as obtained for the prisoner’s dilemma game
(left panel) andmulti-player public goods game (right panel), respectively.M=2000,N=1000,α=10,β=10, ρ=1. For
simplicity, herewe first focus on situationswhereΔA=ΔB and the rest will be further considered in later sections.
Figure 4.ΔA−uphase diagram for the two-player prisoner’s dilemma game subject to the coordinated linking dynamics, as obtained
for ρ=0 ((a), (d)), ρ=0.5 ((b), (e)), ρ=1 ((c), (f)), forΔA=ΔB ((a)–(c)), and forΔA=2ΔB, i.e. A BD ¹ D ((d)–(f)). Cyan denotes
the full-C phase andOrange the full-D phase. The dashed lines are boundaries separating different phases and the area between two
dashed lines is themixture phase. The plot indicates a double-edged sword effect of coordinated network-adapting on cooperation
and its potential associationwith network-adapting rate.M=2000,N=1000,α=10,β=10.
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For a further probe of the answer to this nontrivial double-sided effect,figure 6makes a comparison of the
performance of linking dynamics that is based either on the elementary feedback (i.e. regarding solely either
strategy or self-assessment) or on their combination. Intriguingly, it reflects that these two components
normally bring about better results when they are used in combination than individually, which emphasizes the
synergy effect of strategy feedback and self-optimization compensation on reinforcement of cooperation. First,
theΔA−u phase diagram in figure 7 evidences that in the absence of strategy feedback the cooperation level
decays quickly to zero once the value of u exceeds 0.2with all values ofΔA. That is to say, such inherent
compensation is supposed to become invalid and fail to sustain cooperation as soon as the value of u oversteps
this critical point. In this regard, further trust in themessage transferred by this channelmay cause the confusing
interference to strategy feedback in the context of coordinated network-adapting. And a foreseeable result is the
greater the network-adapting rate, themore serious the interference. Second, remember that a relatively large
network-adapting rate generally corresponds to a large threshold of u that labels the extinction of cooperation in
the population as shown infigure 3. Consequently, a double-edged sword effect of coordinated network-
adapting on cooperation in respect to the relatively large values ofΔA and u is established in figure 4, as a result of
asynchronous failure of these two feedback. In a nutshell, our analysis suggests not only a double-sided effect of
coordinated network evolution on cooperation, andmore importantly, also that the network adapting rate is a
key factor responsible for transforming such a complicate impact. The result highlights the complexity of a
multi-layer network as a complete functional entity rather than a simple superposition ofmonolayer
counterparts.
As themost direct and accessible feedback from the game interaction, opponents’ strategies have almost
been regarded as the only driving force of network evolution in the study of dynamic single-layer networks
[28–31]. Rewiring linkswith unsatisfactory co-players based solely on their strategies has often been referred to
as the optimal transient network-adapting for cooperation and has long been seen as a reliable pathway for
raising cooperation in thesemodels. Inwhat follows, we evidence that, in the presence of aforementioned
Figure 5.Positive (Negative) effect of coordinated network-adapting on the evolution of cooperation in the slow-regulated (fast-
modulated)network for the two-player prisoner’s dilemma game.M=2000,N=1000,α=10,β=10.
Figure 6. Synergy effect of strategic feedback and self-optimizing compensation on improvement of cooperation. Dashed line denotes
the result for strategy based linking dynamics.Dashed–dotted line represents the result for self-optimizing compensation based linking
dynamics. Solid line is the result for linking dynamics based on their combination.Note that different horizontal scales are utilized for
comparison purposes.M=2000,N=1000,α=10,β=10, ρ=1,ΔA=ΔB=0.1.
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inherent cross-layer self-optimization compensation, coordinated network-adapting tends to evokemuch
better promotion of cooperation, issuing a remarkable challenge to the self-reliant network-adapting. Because
there is no cross-layer strategy-learning and the same agent often adopts different strategies in two layers, we
thus choose income instead of strategy as the potential cross-layer compensation channel bridging nonidentical
dynamical processes taking place in different layers. Infigure 8, the S-shaped curve discloses a positive
correlation between the cooperation level andα. Refer to the introduction in section 2, it elucidates that taking
the positive compensation inspires cooperationwhen an agent has an advantage over her duplicate in the other
layer in terms of income.Otherwise, cooperation is to varying degree suppressed. The rationality behind this
phenomenon lies in that, for positiveα infigure 8, when the positive compensation occurs it probably presages
the agent is living in a game environment conducive to reproduction, at least, not theworst in comparison to her
duplicate in the other layer. In this regard, if one plans to optimize the network structure in pursuit of personal
evolutionary success, the cross-layer feedback should suggest her to continuously preserve the existing social
ties, i.e. just consistent with a positive compensation. Especially, the secondary enhancement of cooperation
resulted from the addition of inherent cross-layer self-assessment compensation exemplifies that the optimal
transient network-adapting relying solely on strategy feedback in the context of single-layer dynamic networks
[35]might be, from a long-termperspective, no longer optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the
background ofmultiplex networks. Aswe have shown, themulti-layer nature ofmultiplex networks could
inherently offer agents amirror to self-assess their behaviour. Accordingly, the expansion of feedback channel
fostered by the inherentmulti-domain nature ofmultiplex networks is inclined to providemore reliable and
efficient solutions to the further improvement and optimization of network dynamics in accomplishing some
desired and difficult tasks.
The adapting speed quantifies the ability to reorganize network structure dynamically in response to the
dynamic state of nodes. Previous studies report that high-speed network-adapting is almost a necessary
Figure 7.ΔA−u phase diagram subject to the self-optimizing compensation based linking dynamics forΔA=ΔB (left panel) and
A BD ¹ D , i.e.ΔA=2ΔB (right panel). It implies that the self-assessment compensation scheme is going to become invalid once the
dilemma strength exceeds a certain value.M=2000,N=1000,α=10,β=10, ρ=1.
Figure 8. S-shaped curve shows that the preference in compensation choice plays an important role in alternating the function of
intertwined linking dynamics.M=2000,N=1000,β=10, ρ=1,ΔA=ΔB=0.1, u=0.1.
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condition for coevolution dynamics to encourage cooperation [28, 29, 34, 52, 53]. In dynamic interdependent
networks, however, we claim this issue can be, to some degree, addressed by seeking solutions from the
perspective of coordination of different dynamical processes that simultaneously proceed in different layers. In
social network analysis, besides, the importance of a node is normally associatedwith its topological parameters,
especially with its degree that is typically interpreted as themathematicalmeasure of social influence
(importance) and social diversity [59, 60]. Next, we advance the coordinated linking dynamics bymapping the
so-called social influence into the cross-layer self-optimization compensation. To this end, we rewrite the cross-



































































where i iA B* is the rescaled coordination factor. In analogywith themanipulation in [61], the inter-layer feedback
arising from the other dependent layer is amplified to a certain extent depending on its influence and importance
in the corresponding layer.With this improved compensation formula, the cooperation level is again pulled up.
Nontrivially, figure 9 demonstrates the fundamental advantages of collaborative network-adapting in
advocating cooperation. It confirms that heavily intertwined slow-tuned networksmost of the time have the
ability to outperform slightly coupled fast-regulated networks in regard to inspiring the propagation of altruistic
cooperation.Meanwhile, it also informs us that in the study of dynamic interdependent networks, coordinating
different linking dynamics based on some feasible feedback across different layers can probably provide a new
channel tomake up for the shortcomings thatmost of the time are caused by the limited network-adapting
speed. In view of such extraordinary observations, we claim that coordinated network-adapting is able toweaken
network-adapting rate’s dominant effect that is reported to frequently emerge in a coevolution context.
Therefore, ourfindingsmay further evoke some follow-up research in this direction.
Despite the fundamentality of link formation in evolving dynamic networks, hitherto, the effect of link
formation cost has often been ignored in the study of cooperation dynamics. The largemajority of studies
mainly concern the cost and benefit of a link at the level of interaction rather than the inherent cost of
establishing andmaintaining a social tie. This will not be true formany real situations. In fact, creating and
preserving a social tiemay be inherently costly [54, 62], for instance, involving long-distance travel or spending
tremendous amounts of time. For generality’s sake, we let the game organizer to bear the cost of forming a new
link in the present work. As the benefit each link produces for an agent only varies between 0 and 2, sowe confine
this cost to a closed interval [0, 2]. On the one hand, it shows infigure 10 that the addition of link formation cost
often has a positive effect on cooperation just as reported in [54]. For a given value of u, if link formation cost
grows, then the long-term cooperation level tends to increase too.Of great significance here is that the further
study infigure 11 demonstrates not only can coordinated network-adapting impel the population to the full-C
state, it also requiresmuch less link formation cost and time consumption than its self-reliant counterparts. It
therefore to some extent underlines the universal efficiency andmerit that coordinated network evolutionmay
Figure 9. Fundamental advantages of coordinated network evolution over its self-reliant counterpart in boosting cooperation. The
plot underlines that with the application of coordinated dynamical linking it is possible for slow-tuned networks to outperform fast-
regulated networks in terms of alleviating social dilemmas, destabilizing the dominant role of network-adapting speed in this context.
M=2000,N=1000,α=10,β=10.
10
New J. Phys. 21 (2019) 073057 ZYang et al
enjoy, in comparison to self-reliant network evolution, in terms of economizing resources reservationwhen it is
used to alternate the systemdynamics in order to achieve a specific expected goal.
4.Discussion
In network science, dynamic networks have proven to be capable of innovating better descriptions of real
systemswhose characteristics constantly adapt to changing environments. Especially in the context of
evolutionary game theory, for this sake, dynamical linking, also known as linking dynamics or partner choice
[51, 52], has been explored extensively as a feasible avenue for the evolution of cooperation in spatial games
[28–30, 32, 34, 52, 54]. Likewise,multiplex networks inherently enjoy the super capability tomodel coupled
structures and coupled dynamical processes [43–46]. On account of theirmore comprehensive and appropriate
portrayals of real contact networks, these two classes of networks have been recognized as highly effective tools
for analyzing cooperation dynamics regarding structured populations [35, 37]. However, real networksmost of
the time are not onlymulti-layered yet also probably evolving, andmoreover, sub-layers could evolve at
nonidentical rates. And this key point is clearly often overlooked by existing literatures. In this regard, it is of
great urgency and significance to survey the coordination of different dynamical processes in nonidentical sub-
layers, which should have been a fundamental problem in themultiplex network context. For this purpose, we
propose an intertwined coevolutionarymodel inwhich both the self-reliant and coordinated network adapting
are incorporated. Andwe showcase that such a simple yet effective coevolutionary rule enriches the system
dynamics and has a profound impact on the evolution of cooperation.
In comparison to previousmodels by pacheco et al [51, 52], Santos et al [28] andRand et al [53]where link
reconnection aswell as its rate largely depends on the type of partners, and by Fu et al [29, 31] inwhich indirect
reciprocity is embedded via reputation, here the fate of each link is influenced both by assessments of two
terminal nodes in the current residential layer and also by feedback from the other interdependent layer. As a
result, itmost of the timemakes the update and remove of links distinguish remarkably from themost-used
Figure 10.Costly link formation nourishes the evolution of cooperation. The cooperation level in dependence on various link
formation cost for lcost=0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, and 2, respectively.M=2000,N=1000,α=10,β=10, ρ=1,ΔA=ΔB=0.1.
Figure 11.Normalized link formation cost and time resource consumption for driving the system to the full-C phasewith respect to
ρ=0, 0.5, and 1, respectively. It indicates coordinated network evolution helps to significantly reduce link formation cost and time
consumption comparedwith its counterparts.M=2000,N=1000,α=10,β=10,ΔA=ΔB=0.1, lcost=1.5.
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‘either-keep-or-remove’ rule. The driving force responsible for the evolution of networkmainly consists of two
parts. One is strategic feedback extracted from game interactions of current habitat layer, which is themain
thruster of network evolution. The other pregnant with the self-assessment consciousness that is premised upon
themulti-domain nature ofmultiplex networks encodes cross-layer compensation and provokes the synergistic
network evolution.
We show that coordinated network-adaptingmight be a double-edged sword to cooperation. For instance, it
often has a positive (negative) effect on cooperationwith respect to slow-tuned (fast-regulated) dynamic
networks. Andwe attribute this to the asynchronous failure of concerned feedback fromdifferent layers.
Importantly, due in large to the expansion of feedback channel, coordinated network evolution is likely to help
improve the dispersal of cooperation in the followingways, such asmaking up for the deficiency caused by the
insufficient network-adapting rate, and cutting down link formation cost as well as time consumption needed
for propelling the population to the full-C phase. These results hence emphasize the inherent superiorities of
collaboratively evolving dynamic interdependent networks over single-layer dynamic networks in publicizing
altruistic behaviour.
In summary, by this workwe find that thewell-reportedmulti-domain nature ofmultiplex networks could
naturally offer dynamical processes proceeding in sub-layers some feasible compensation choices bymeans of
inherent self-assessment so that these dynamical processesmay act as amirror to each other for self-
optimization in the long-term coevolution, therefore yielding a series of remarkable improvements in
functionality ofmultiplex networks. Given its universality, the observation suggests that the proper
coordination of dynamical processes on the basis of reliable feedback channeling sub-layersmay be an effective
optimizer of network functionality and allow the possibility of further rescue of cooperation, so thatmuch of the
previous research on coevolution dynamics [35]might be recast in terms of coordinated network evolution in
themultiplex network context.
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